Taqadum and the Use of Civilian Protection to Serve the War Agenda of the Rapid Support Forces and the UAE

Amgad Fareid El-Tayeb

One might commend the "Taqadum" alliance for finally addressing the issue of civilian protection, after 18 months of denial, justification, and stalling regarding the violations. Finally, they have begun to recognize this vital issue and call for the necessary frameworks to achieve it. But rather than adopting this as a neutral, humanitarian stance that they could use to rebuild bridges with the people whose suffering they have contributed to—through justifying and whitewashing killing, displacement, torture, looting, and the rape of women—Taqadum insists on using this humanitarian banner to serve the military faction they are allied with. Just as they previously attempted to utilise the revolutionary slogans and the rhetoric of democratic transition to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the early days of the war, they are now instrumentalizing the call for civilian protection.

The quest to protect civilians is, above all, a humanitarian cause and should have been the primary concern for anyone invested in Sudan's public affairs from the first day for the outbreak of the war. Instead, Taqadum has been preoccupied with the prospect of a swift power-sharing arrangement, one that would reward the warring factions for their actions and hand them a place at the table.

This humanitarian concern should not be politicized or exploited to tip the military balance in favor of one side over the other. Civilian protection pertains to the victims of this war, making it shameful to use their suffering to serve the interests of either faction. But this is precisely what Taqadum's rhetoric does—turning civilian protection into a political tool that serves the RSF under the pretense of humanitarian concern.

Taqadum members, including its leader Dr. Abdalla Hamdok and spokesperson Bakri El-Jack, outlined elements of their proposal for civilian protection: a no-fly zone, the establishment of safe zones, and an international ground force to protect civilians. Bakri El-Jack went further to suggest establishing three camps along the borders with South Sudan, Egypt, and Chad to shelter civilians—an idea, bordering on absurdity, and unworthy of serious discussion.

The establishment of safe zones has long been advocated by humanitarian organizations and think tanks and centers focused on Sudan since the time of Taqadum's members were still portraying the situation in Rufaa as "safe," hosting celebratory meetings with Hemedti in Addis Ababa to sign agreements and declarations of principles. Or perhaps even earlier, when Taqadum—then known as the Civilian Front—was manipulating reports of atrocities, and fabricating rape cases and attributing them to the other side to reduce pressure on the RSF. Naturally, safe zones should be free from ground and air attacks, allowing civilians in Sudan to maintain a semblance of normal life. This proposal has been discussed thoroughly to make it feasible, but Taqadum insists on coupling it with a politically charged demand for a no-fly zone, complicating the situation and reducing civilian protection to a matter of political rivalry.

There is already a no-fly zone over parts of Darfur, alongside an arms embargo that the UAE has been flagrantly violating since the first month of the war—without any condemnation from Taqadum. Now, their call for a no-fly zone is clearly driven by the UAE, aiming to reduce the escalating costs of delivering arms, supplies, and equipment to the RSF through Chad and other countries. The UAE recently attempted to use the Geneina Airport, but was prevented by the Sudanese army's air presence. Additionally, the involvement of neighboring countries in supporting the RSF was one of the factors that revealed the UAE's role in Sudan's war, creating international and regional embarrassment. UAE aircraft have continued to breach Sudanese airspace to supply the RSF without any objection from Taqadum. Instead, some members—including Taqadum's chairman, who receives his salary from the UAE as the director of one of its research centers—have defended the UAE as a "sisterly nation," even as its weapons kill Sudanese civilians. What, then, has prompted Taqadum to call for a no-fly zone now?

One might wonder, if this proposal had been implemented earlier, what would have happened to the civilians in Wad al-Noura, where RSF mercenaries massacred hundreds before being stopped by air strikes? Or to the civilians in El Fasher, who were spared from RSF attacks by air force intervention? Do the members of Taqadum find it acceptable for them to face a similar fate of thr people of Geneina? Civilian protection mechanisms cannot be formulated without first answering whom and what civilians need protection from. These are not questions that can be dodged through political evasion. The answers lie in the facts on the ground—not in evasive statements like those of Taqadum's founding member and RSF advisor Nasr al-Din Abdelbari, who, in diplomatic meetings to market the RSF, describes civilian losses as an "acceptable price" for eliminating Islamists.

If the goal is truly civilian protection, then the safe zones that Taqadum claims to support now should suffice, especially with effective monitoring mechanisms to protect these areas from attacks by both sides. The call for a no-fly zone might have been reasonable in the early months of the war to limit its spread and prevent the use of high-impact weapons. But now, after all the destruction, this demand only serves to shift the military balance and restrict the means by which the two sides confront each other. It serves the agenda of an external power (the UAE), which funds, supports, and shelters both Taqadum and the RSF, casting doubt on the neutrality of the proposal and those advocating for it—something that has now become obvious to all.

To the members of Taqadum, who claim to represent the Sudanese people and monopolize their voices: "Shame on you." This deliberate merging of your political agendas and your attempt to carry out the orders of your sponsors at the expense of Sudanese lives and safety is disgraceful. And if you do not fear the consequences of your actions, then at least feel some shame.