The inevitable necessity to improve the current political process to face reality instead of drowning in conceptual exercises

The inevitable necessity to improve the current political process to face reality instead of drowning in conceptual exercises

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

 

The escalating polarization between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, as well as the state of mobilization and counter-mobilization with statements and military forces, revealed a fundamental flaw in the design of the political process, which, in its current form, increased the risks of instability rather than reducing them. These events also demonstrated the falsehood of the theory held by a number of actors in the local political milieu and the corridors of the international community that the political crisis is a result of divisions between the civilians. But, the present situation demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the military-military rivalry poses the biggest threat to the nation.

Without delving into the debate over the roots and causes of the imbalance in the design of the political process, which made it more favourable to one of the coup partners and the parties to the military-military conflict (the Army and the Rapid Support Forces), the civilian component that seeks democratic transformation should not be concerned with the power struggles within the military component. The attempt to benefit from it by backing one party or the other is a short-sighted strategy that does not help the democratic transition and does not advance it, but rather increases the likelihood of a clash between the country's diverse military forces. In this regard, the Civil Democratic Front should only be concerned with reforming the Sudanese security and military establishment in order to form a unified professional army that maintains national security without interfering in politics, the economy, or other aspects of state administration.

Continuing to deal with this issue by postponing and ignoring it once, or by mediating between Burhan and Hamidti to reduce the intensity of the dispute between them whenever a war of statements and mobilization erupts between them, or by trying to benefit and play on the contradictions between them on third occasions, is not feasible anymore. Just like it's not helpful to treat this issue like a box to be checked off in the workshops' mental exercises, it's also not helpful to treat this issue as a political non-issue.

Indeed, the process of restructuring the security and military sectors involves technical components that will take time to complete, but there are administrative decisions that can be made if there is genuine political will and commitment to move this process forward. This political commitment should be built on the recognition of the following fundamental concepts and facts:

-        The executive apparatus of the state is the sole entity that should monopolize the use of weapons and implements of justifiable violence required to protect the nation, administer the law, and maintain order. These tools should not be independent of the executive branch, which is, of course, subject to civilian control. There should be no separate, independent, or insulated armed military forces from the executive apparatus that administers state affairs. The notion that the military forces do not accept being commanded by an unelected transitional government demonstrates their uncertainty over the legitimacy of the transition itself. Some strive to forget that the legitimacy of the revolution is the source of the legitimacy of the transition. The government that the revolutionary forces agree to construct has complete and uncompromised legitimacy. It must oversee the administration, reform, and development of all state agencies, including the military. Anything less is merely acquiescence to the demands of the putschists and their claims of a coup.

-        The process of security and military reform is not limited to merely combining Sudan's numerous military forces into one facility or under one command and decommission the surplus. This is a part of the process, but it is not the entire procedure. This process also includes a review of the norms of work and methodology for these forces' performance, as well as a review of their tasks, methods of training, arming, deployment, and other technical aspects that must be decided upon scientifically and in accordance with national security goals. Implementing and realizing these goals may be left to the military given to their specialization and technical knowledge, but identifying and agreeing on these goals should be the responsibility of the country's civilian political leadership. Politicians must address the question of what the function of Sudan's unified national army should be.

-        Any use of guns in politics must be made strictly illegal. Particularly the use of government weaponry. The employees of the armed forces are state employees who get their wages and salaries in order to carry out their assigned duties, which consist of safeguarding the state and its constitutional structure, rather than exercising guardianship over it.

-        The presence of the Rapid Support Forces and the rest of the militias that serve specific political parties is an oddity and a situation that must be terminated quickly. This begins with the cessation of active and ongoing recruitment by the Rapid Support Forces and other armed groupings that signed the Juba Peace Agreement. The Rapid Support Forces began as a political militia in 2013 within the Operations Corps of the National Intelligence and Security Service of the National Congress party regime, and this status persisted for years prior to its 2017 subordination to the army. Inevitably, its independent political ideology evolved as its leader's (Hemedti) ambitions grew, until it became a political pressure card that was exploited to attain political objectives. Using it for political pressure and maneuvering resembles the military coup. It is an alternative method of employing firearms in political action. The technical aspects of integrating, deconstructing, and restructuring these forces may need time (although the Operations Corps forces were disbanded overnight), but preventing its presence from being used as a political pressure card must cease immediately.

-        Trying to abandon, manipulate, or trade any of these fundamental rules on the current (Um - Dafso) political market is tantamount to recognizing the legalization of the coup situation. These principles are a unit that cannot be dissociated. And the previous transitional experience, which began in 2019 and ended with a coup in October 2021, demonstrated the absurdity of presuming the possibility of bargaining about them and the fatal error made by the civil forces in adopting the partnership principle in the manner in which it was accepted.

Therefore, what can be done in the midst of the current political process to avert the threat of civil war, which still looms in the distance?

First of all, we need to stop viewing the conflict between Al-Burhan and Hamidti over the multiplicity of armies in Sudan as a merely a personal political disagreement that can be resolved through negotiation and defusing the situation whenever their exchanges grow tense. They should approach this problem on the grounds that it is a national matter and not a personal one between them. These men are in charge of organizations that are contributing to the situation that need to be changed. In fact, one of the factors that initially sparked the October 25, 2021 coup was the delay in reforming these institutions during the prior transitional phase. Dealing with this matter as a merely political disagreement between the two men would fuel their ambition for to maintain power and would imply that the existence of their coup situation might be justifiable (a coup is the practice of politics using guns), which the political process was meant to seek to prevent.

Second, civilian political groups must adopt a cohesive stance on the proliferation of state military troops and agencies in Sudan. This position should go beyond the generalities indicated in the slogan of the unified national army to practical details about the method of its formation, its objectives, its financing, and the financing of its formation process as well. These practical specifics transform the abstract conversation about this crucial subject into a practical thesis. This will not occur through the exercises of completing framework workshops, but rather through a genuine cross-pollination between the various political orientations.  This also avails the possibility for the civil forces to form a unified front around a goal on which they can all agree, but this requires that those who care about the future of stability and the establishment of democracy in this country stop exploiting the divisions between the military camps to advance their political agendas.

Third, the military in both camps should be compelled to abide to their prior obligations and refrain from engaging in politics. Reforming the state structure, which includes the military, is largely a political matter in which the military contributes its technical expertise. Attempts to postpone this issue until after the creation of the framework government will result in the crisis being pushed into the future, where the political process will be weakened and vulnerable to the de facto balances resulting from the independence of the two armies (the army and the RSF).

Fourth, the international community must support the fundamentals for the establishment of a modern state in Sudan by pressuring the military parties with which it exchanges to accept a clear process to unify and reform themselves, rather than attempting to bury the disputes or reach compromises to postpone addressing the issue. The later would only postpone the onset of a new catastrophe in Sudan. The existing usage of carrots and sticks for short-term targets that do not extend beyond finishing the workshops to form a government should be expanded to address the most dangerous issue in the country.

 

These are preliminary ideas for discussion; they may serve as a starting point for repairing and developing the political process, rather than proceeding as if it were perfect despite its many flaws.