The position of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the current political situation: The fingers of Hemedti, Taha Osman Al Hussein, Forces for Freedom and Change and others

The position of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the current political situation: The fingers of Hemedti, Taha Osman Al Hussein, Forces for Freedom and Change and others

Amgad Fareid El-Tayeb

                                       

  

Perhaps the return of Maulana Muhammad Othman Al-Mirghani, the leader of the Khatmiyya sect and the chairperson of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the accompanying dispute in his reception ceremony at the airport between the two factions of the party that ended with the departure of his son Mohammed Al-Hassan and the political secretary of the party Ibrahim Al-Merghani for the reception ceremony, leaving the reception to the faction led by his other son Jaafar, and the subsequent incident of the attack on Ibrahim and Mohammed Al-Hassan during their departure from the airport, deserve to consider again the position and role of the DUP in the political process and how it impacts it.

Mohammed Al-Hassan Al-Merghani and Ibrahim Al-Merghani are leading a wing within the DUP that intends to participate in the political process that the Forces for Freedom and Change announced, starting by the understandings FFC reached with the military based on the draft constitutional document prepared by the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association. FFC announced its intention to turn these understandings into a framework agreement between them and the leaders of the coup.

Muhammad al-Hassan, in his organizational capacity, and with him Ibrahim al-Mirghani, signed the draft constitutional document in preparation for their joining the coalition of a civilian bloc that includes them with Freedom and Change, the Popular Congress Party and Ansar al-Sunna to carry on the talks with military. Meanwhile, Jaafar al-Mirghani, the deputy head of the party, joined the other alliance of the Forces of Freedom and Change - which supported the coup since its inception - which changed its name from the National Accord to the Democratic Bloc after Jaafar joined it, all of which are misplaced kingdom titles.

The Forces for Freedom and Change have a logical basis for allying with the Popular Congress and Ansar al-Sunna in the midst of their struggle against the October 25 coup, considering the principled position that both of parties showed against the military coup, but what is puzzling is the diligence to annex the DUP - or at least a faction of it, to the civil bloc alliance. Particularly since the party did not announce a position rejecting the coup, if it did not express its support for it, after the meeting of the coup leader Al-Burhan with the leader of the party Al-Mirghani in Cairo in April 2022.

 Some circles of the FFC claim that they want to take advantage of the historical sectarian influence of the DUP to ensure the stability of the transitional period especially in East Sudan, but the validity of this assumption, which is based on an ancient history, may not be true today. Furthermore, this influence is not owned by the faction with whom FFC is allied (Muhammad al-Hassan / Ibrahim), but is on the other faction, led by Jaafar, commissioned by his father.

Understanding what is happening requires going back to the basics and trying to decipher the complexities of the current political process.

First, I argue – and many others know how true this claim is – that this political process that is taking place is essentially based on a deal between Rapid Support Forces Leader Hemeti and the leadership of Freedom and Change, which guarantees each of them some political gains and reassurances in the next phase. This is evidenced by Hamidati's welcoming of the constitutional document as soon as it is announced and even before seeing it according to his statement. The key to the answer here is Taha Osman Al Hussein. Taha Osman al-Hussein, who for a long while served as the director of the office of ousted President Omar al-Bashir, was the mastermind behind the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces, and enabling it in this independent way during the era of the NCP, but in the late years of Bashir regime (2017) and as a result of Islamist conflicts he was dismissed and was even detained for a short bit. Hemedti returned him the favour by saving him and securing his exit to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia granted him its citizenship and assigned him the position of adviser for African affairs. Taha has close ties to the Khatamia sect to which he belongs and has direct lineage ties to Ibrahim Al-Merghani (brothers in law). Part of Hemeti’s understandings with the leaders of FFC seems to be to secure Taha al-Hussein’s return to the political scene through the return of Ibrahim and his wing. And let’s not forget that Ibrahim al-Merghani himself was the minister of tele-communications during Bashir’s last cabinet. All of this seems consistent with the nature of the deal being made.

Second, external influence. Ibrahim al-Mirghani appears to be the closest to the UAE sphere of influence, the country he has lived in since Bashir’s ouster. Of course, the UAE seems enthusiastic about the political deal, which guarantees its prime ally, Himidati, more guarantees and independence. Of course, it will not refuse the return of her adviser Taha Osman al-Hussein to influence the Sudanese political scene. Through its seat in the Quartet mechanism (US, UK, Emirates and Saudi Arabia) that oversaw the faltering birth of this political process, UAE has lobbied hard to accommodate the wing of Mohammed al-Hassan/Ibrahim within the civil bloc coalition, which is based on the constitutional document sponsored again by the Quartet. This seems understandable in light of the tense situation in Yemen, the possibility of the collapse of the truce and the return of war there, in which UAE and Saudi Arabia need rapid support forces. On the other hand, the Jaafar/Mawlana faction is heavily under Egyptian influence. Egypt has undisguised objections with the continued independence of the Rapid Support Forces and tends to support the continuation of consolidating the coup by imposing more army control.

 

The Forces for Freedom and Change have gone wrong in continuing to pursue a political process separated from the street, and have made greater mistake in trying to assemble opportunistic forces to build an unprincipled coalition based on potentially wrong historical calculations. The camp of revolution is based on values and principles, some of its parties may had miscalculation here or there, but the use of the forces of the old regime will not push in any way by the movement of the revolution or transition forward. The betting on the disgrepable situation of the Rapid Support Forces in protecting the transition from retraction proved to have failed on October 25.

It is time to take the future of this country more seriously and learn from the mistakes that have been made. Betting on the internal divisions of political parties and components is a totalitarian exercise that has nothing to do with democracy, and it prevailed during the era of the former Bashir and led to nothing other than more devastation and polarization in political life in Sudan.