The Labyrinth of the Democratic Transition in Sudan
The Labyrinth of
the Democratic Transition in Sudan
The transitional period started by
an agreement between Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) (a broad alliance of
political parties and syndicates who directed the revolution) and the military.
The agreed upon constitutional document structured the transitional government
in Sovereignty Council of military and civilian representatives with
honorary powers to act collectively as the head of state, a non-partisan
cabinet, and a Transitional Legislative Council, in which political forces
would be represented. Later, the
transition was augmented by signing Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) with armed movements
represented in the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in October 2020. The
peace negotiations leading to the JPA witnessed the first military encroachment on
executive tasks, with the appointment of a negotiating delegation headed by
General Hemedti (Commander of the infamous Rapid Support Forces). This
encroachment never stopped. The military increasingly interfered in foreign
policies, economy, supervision of state agencies, civil service appointments…etc.
They did not hide their eagerness for having more executive powers, and their
lack of contentment with the honorary status of the Sovereignty Council. The
term (military component) was coined and used widely to describe the five
military members of the Sovereignty Council, to distinguish them from the other
six civilian members, although the Sovereignty Council should have exercised
its functions as a single body in which decisions are taken by a two-thirds
majority.
JPA granted the
SRF 25% share of cabinet, breaking the non-partisanship stipulation of the initial
agreement. FFC demanded amending the constitutional document to allow similar
participation of its components. This resulted in full partisan composition of
Hamdok’s second cabinet in February 2021. The FFC had previously shown its
eagerness to play an executive role. The amendment of the constitutional
document to establish the Council of Governing Partners as a supervisory body over
the transition in December 2020, aroused public discontent to the extent that
the term (blood partnership) was coined to refer to it. It appeared as an
attempt to avoid the formation of the Legislative Council.
Increasingly,
the issue of powers, not tasks, became the main focus of all actors in the
transition. Hence, October 25 coup was no surprise to anyone. The military
component wanted more power and control. Over the months preceding the coup,
the Army’s official newspaper continued to promote a discourse about the
ineffectiveness of civilian government and call for army intervention to fix
things. The military’s support for the FFC to assume executive responsibilities
was only in order to create discord, and then division among civilians. This
actually happened later under pretensions of lack of inclusive participation in
power. The military component spared no effort in promoting these divisions and
trying to distort the image of civilian politicians and assassinate their
characters, using both local tools and automated disinformation campaigns with
Russian links on social media that encourage military control and undermine the
civilian government. Some civilian politicians and political forces - even from
within the FFC - participated in these smear campaigns with unprecedented
shortsightedness.
In addition to
the longing of military to power, the coup had other reasons; the oncoming of
the date of handing over the Sovereign Council chairmanship from the military
to civilians, the generals’ concerns about the results of investigating the massacre
of the dispersal of the sit-in in the absence of any serious moves by all
parties to reveal facts or initiate practical measures for truth,
reconciliation and transitional justice, the military's desire to maintain
their influence and avoid the process of reforming military and security
institutions in Sudan, preserving the huge economic interests of the military
that grew extensively during three decades of kleptocratic rule of the National
Congress Party, Ties with the toppled regime and the heavy presence of Islamist
ideologue elements in the security and military services that all efforts to
purging and reform were resisted in the past two years, and the support of neighboring
countries and Russia for a military takeover to protect their interests and
thwarting the democratic transition, which may be an encouraging model for
spreading democracy in the region in a way that threaten their ruling models. Russia
strongly seeks to establish a military naval base on the coast of Sudan on the
Red Sea, in agreement with the Sudanese military. With the presence of Wagner
group and its investment arm M Invest LLC since 2017 in Sudan, Russian
fingerprints all over this coup.
A fundamental structural reason behind the coup was the entrenchment of
a misconceptional term that was repeated frequently by civilian leaders,
including the Prime Minister. It is portraying the transitional government as a
partnership between civilian and military components. The repetition of this
term diverted the focus of the transition from tasks to powers, and fueled the
delusional perception of the military of their entitlement to exercise
executive powers other than what the constitutional document stipulates. This
concept created a perception of the existence of entitlements of authorities for
(partners) rather than the state structures, and made agreements between these
partners superior and dominant over the agreed constitutional text that set the
course and tasks of the transition. Of course, these agreements were unstable,
volatile, and subject to different circumstances and political alliances
between different actors in different times and subjects. In conclusion, the
transitional period lost its blueprint as a result of the consolidation of this
concept, and its course became hostage to the balance of power and temporary
alliances between parties. The dominance of this concept over the transitional
government impeded the ability of the state apparatus to implement unified
policies and make decisions. The rights of the partners to agree to intervene
to change or disrupt policies and decisions were superior to the powers of the
executive state apparatus. This made the executive branch vulnerable to
constant political blackmail and contributed to further dividing the civilian
component whose parties resorted at different times to seek help and ally
themselves with the unified military partner to achieve their political goals. This
fueled the military’s delusion of their guardianship over state, and fed their coup tendencies more. The outcome of the
multiplicity of decision-making centers has been disastrous at all levels.
On November 21, Hamdok signed an agreement
with the putschists after which he was released from house arrest and
reinstated to his position. This did not reverse of
the coup nor resolve the situation for many reasons. The substance of the
agreement was nothing but confirming and attempting to codify desires and decisions
of the putschists. Moreover, whether he signed voluntarily and convinced or
not, several weeks after the signing, it became clear that Hamdok is helpless
and incapable of reversing essential decisions taken during the coup. He could
not even restore the syndicates which Burhan dissolved during the coup. What is
more, Major General Al-Burhan, a few days after the signing of the agreement,
unilaterally appointed the head of the judiciary and the country’s attorney
general, the two highest judicial positions, without any kind of consultation.
Prime Minister was only able to take some administrative decisions on civil
service appointments and even those were subject to clearance by the military. Hamdok
was forced to accept the continuity of the ministers who participated and
supported the coup in their ministerial seats, forefronted by the leader of the
Justice and Equality Movement and Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim. Moreover,
Hamdok did not have the mandate from the political forces to cut such a deal
with the putschists. The scene of signing November 21 agreement which was
attended only by the pro-coup politicians was an indication that Hamdok was taking an
improper partisan stance which unfortunately is not pro-democracy. Hamdok lost
-or forced to lose- much of the popular and political trust and support that
was rallied around him as a symbol of legitimacy after the October 25 coup and
before it.
It would have
been possible to restore trust (or at least part of it) if he had the ability
to make decisions that reflect commitment to civil democratic transformation
and restoration of the path of transition in Sudan, and pointed to the
shortcomings of this agreement and presented his proposals to address them. On
the contrary, Hamdok launched a PR campaign to promote the coup and justify its
orientations, adopting the same putschists’ discourse about excluding political
forces from the scene, and adopting the call for elections at the end of the
transitional period that is practically concluded by the coup. As if the
October 25 coup did not happen. As if the transitional period is just a space
of time not linked to implementing specific tasks needed to build democracy in
Sudan. As if the Sudanese people and the national political forces are supposed
to predestinately consent to the military tutelage over the political process
in Sudan and to surrender to its threat of coups and bloodshed at all times
when they don’t like the political track. It was not only a discourse but also
actions. In the first week of signing and before any consultations or
understandings with political forces, Hamdok's advisors invited international
organizations and donors to discuss perpetrations for elections. Diplomats who
attended the meeting indicated that Hamdok's staff “did not know
what exactly they wanted from it”. Most likely, this meeting - as early as it was-
was an attempt from Hamdok’s staff to appease the military putschists and send a message that they
had actively engaged in their plan, and on the other hand, to whitewash their
names by presenting the international community with its favorite discourse about
elections. Nevertheless, this revealed how little they perceive about the
political process and democratic elections. Elections are not a bureaucratic
process, but rather a political process. Those running in these elections are
the political forces not external actors. There is no point in trying to
prepare a field when the players refuse to play in principle, and for good
reasons.
This is not the first time that the path of
democratic transition in Sudan is disrupted after the people revolution toppled
Al-Bashir. After the June 3 massacre, negotiations between
civilians and military stopped. It was not restored until after the visit of
the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his pressure on all parties to
return. Local initiatives did not succeed in restoring the process due to the
lack of confidence in its impartiality and the lack of sufficient weight of
mediators to persuade the parties. Abiy’s restored process was entrusted to the
AU mediation (whose office in Khartoum composted of three people and no ambassador at
the time). The process was shaky, jumbled, and unstructured, depending only on
personal initiatives and contacts of the then African envoy, Mohamed Hassan
Ould Labbat.
This and other reasons related to the capacity of the political movement
that was negotiating while burdened with fatigue issues and intrinsic problems
accumulated during thirty years of the Islamists’ dictatorship, and without
consensus on the state structure, transition process, and the details of the
necessary reforms during it, led the outcomes of that process to be flawed and
full of shortcomings. Even the linguistic formulation of some
constitutional articles was problematic and led to complications in their
implementation. Some important transitional tasks such as security sector
reform, constitution-making process among others were dealt with very lightly
and superficially as mentioning them was just to tick a box. As well, the outcomes
were devoid of grantees and monitoring mechanisms. Partially because of the
weak influence of the AU mediation, its unwillingness or inability to engage in
long-term commitments that it lacks the capacity to implement. But also, the
military component was reluctant to instate such safeguarding mechanisms, and
used populist rhetoric to confuse between what is xenophobic nationalism and
what is patriotic to avoid and stigmatize such proposals. It was a mass
blackmail tactic that worked at the time and is now being used again, backed by
the shortsightedness and immaturity of some actors who do not realize that they
are shooting at their feet and on the path to civil democratic transition in
Sudan.
November 21
agreement did not resolve the October 25 coup, but in practice it became part
of its process. Going back to before October 25 is impossible, if it is at all
useful. The democratic transition, which has been faltering since August 2019,
is practically over by a military coup. This fact
cannot and should not be ignored. Sudan needs a new inclusive political process
to restore the of realizing the aspirations of the people's revolution. it
needs to be inclusive in terms of both actors and issues. Issues that were not
discussed clearly enough in the previous negotiation, such as military reform,
criminal and transitional justice, basis of marginalization, dismantling
economic empowerment, use of traditional influence and soft money in politics,
system of government and state structure, the conducive environment for
democracy, and the constitution-making process should be included in a clear, transparent
and structured discussion among all actors. Those actors include new
influential forces, such as resistance committees and the demands groups, who
had the loudest voice in resisting the coup. The demands and proposals of these
forces should be discussed clearly and publicly in any political process aimed
at stability in Sudan. No country can be governed without adequately
considering the orientations of the organized grassroots groups. Likewise, the
inclusion of the neglected issues of peace with Sudan People's Liberation
Movement led by Al-Hilu and Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel-Wahed Nour
in any prospective political process is crucial. There can be no real
democratic transition in Sudan without completing the peace process and there
can be no inclusive process without the participation of these two major forces.
They have the right -if not the duty- to discuss and present their theses on the
broad national political issues discussed in such a process. Furthermore, the
outstanding peace issues are principally political issues
of a national nature that concern everyone, and need to be discussed by
everyone. The piecemeal approach to addressing Sudan's crises is tested and
proven ineffective.
Any attempt to
impose a political pact on the political and mass movement before a comprehensive
political process will be an absurd totalitarian measure, and its outputs will
not worth the ink with which it was written. In order for any political pact to
be respected and adhered to, it must be the result of a fully participatory
political process and not prior to it.
Perhaps such
process seems a wishful fantasy in the current situation, especially with the
deep distrust between all parties the inability of the Prime Minister to
confront the reactionary forces and go forward in the path of democratic
transition. However, it is time for the
international community to walk its talk about supporting democratic transition
in Sudan. The congratulatory support and welcoming of the November 21 agreement
are meaningless and aimless. it was born emaciated in its cradle before
clinically die for the Prime Minister's lack of power. It is time to put tangible
objectives for the international efforts and tools. There is an urgent need to
pressure those who carried out a coup to stop and accept the fact that they
cannot rule Sudan with violence, oppression, bullets and fire once again.
Sudanese, who revolted to uproot Al-Bashir's dictatorship, will not accept
replacing one tyrant with another. The ongoing mass resistance since the first
day of the coup is continuing, and increasing. The international community
needs to be honest with itself and with the Sudanese who have had enough of
rhetorical slogans. Threats of sanctions (that are not binding to implement), suspension
of support and other means will be just a waste of time and endorsement of the
status quo unless they are linked to a clear objective. This can be the
initiation of a serious inclusive process to restore the path of democratic
transformation in Sudan and setting a precedent for the rule of law and
punishing democracy saboteurs.
The UN political mission to Sudan (UNITAMS) is in appropriate position
to propose and launch such a process. It is already mandated by the UN Security
Council resolution 2524 (2020) to “assisting the political transition, progress
towards democratic governance, protection and promotion of human rights, and
sustainable peace”. This is all the mandate it needs to initiate such a
process. However, it cannot do it alone. Pressuring the putschists to retreat from their coup process and genuinely engage in a political process, needs serious carrots and sticks. Convincing the political and mass
movement to trust another political process needs serious strong guarantors who
can stand by and support the implementation of the outcomes. Countries and regional
organizations who repeatedly stated their support for civilian democratic
transition in Sudan should put their influence and weight on a unified platform
aiming at a well-planned, structured and practical process. This can take place
by a panel of influential international figures who carry the influence of
their countries and organizations to support the UN mission in achieving this
and coordinate the different pressure and influence cards of the different
international actors behind one specific target.
Sudan today is at a crossroads on the path of its revolution. The Sudanese people have clearly chosen their path through peaceful struggle to achieve their aspirations for democracy and stability under the slogans of their revolution: freedom, peace and justice. But the question remains how serious is the rest of the world in supporting democracy and helping Sudan transition to a democratic state.
Comments
Post a Comment