Fwd: Beyond Wad Madani: How to End War in Sudan


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19 January 2025
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Beyond Wad Madani: How to End War in Sudan

The Pathway to Peace, Healing, Rebuilding, and Restoring Nationhood in Sudan

Amgad Fareid Eltayeb

On December 15, 2023, the fall of Wad Madani, the capital city of Al-Jazirah State, to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militias marked a profound and transformative moment in the trajectory of the Sudanese war. Al-Jazirah State had become a prominent sanctuary for the displaced, offering refuge to those fleeing the RSF atrocities in Khartoum, the capital, which had been subjected to unprecedented destruction and displacement orchestrated by the RSF militia. Wad Madani, the capital city of Al-Jazirah State, in the aftermath of Khartoum's collapse, emerged as the epicenter of international humanitarian relief operations, embodying a bastion of hope for countless Sudanese. However, these humanitarian operations had to stop with the fall of Wad Madani into the hands of the RSF militia, and the state descended into the grip of systematic oppression and violence. The RSF militia implemented a deliberate and fascist framework of violations, devastating the lives of local inhabitants and displaced persons alike. This occupation led to a secondary wave of mass displacement, as terror spread through the state. Al-Jazirah bore witness to brutal massacres in its various corners, leaving indelible scars on its landscape and its people.

The situation took a significant turn on January 11, 2024, when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) successfully reclaimed Wad Madani, Sudan's second-largest city and a critical crossroads connecting disparate regions of the country. This achievement represented not just a military victory but also a pivotal shift in the broader conflict dynamics. The recapture of Wad Madani was part of a series of SAF military operations aimed at regaining control over strategic areas across the states of Khartoum, Sennar, and others. This progress, coupled with the extraordinary resilience displayed by the city of Al-Fasher in North Darfur—withstanding RSF assaults for nearly a year—signaled a decisive alteration in the balance of military power, increasingly favoring the national army.

Nevertheless, the military triumphs in Al-Jazirah were accompanied by unspeakable atrocities that cast a long shadow over the victory. These atrocities, particularly in the "Kanabi" areas where communities of agricultural laborers reside, revealed a grim undercurrent of racially motivated violence. These laborers, primarily of Darfuri origin, became victims of barbaric acts of retaliation that transcended all moral and legal boundaries, constituting egregious war crimes.

Although some might argue that such acts of violence were reactive responses to the horrors inflicted by the RSF militias on the residents of Al-Jazirah during their occupation, such reasoning is fundamentally flawed and indefensible. Crimes cannot be met with counter-crimes of equal brutality, for this perpetuates a vicious cycle of revenge, undermining the principles of justice and humanity. Instead of perpetuating the cycle of vengeance that fuels hatred and ethnic strife, those who aided the militia should face the full force of the letter of the law, with its blind justice that spares no room for prejudice or anger. The rule of law must prevail as an impartial and blind arbiter, eschewing emotions of anger or bias. Any tolerance for retributive violence only deepens ethnic divisions and serves to legitimize the RSF militia's strategic use of regional and ethnic dimensions to justify their criminality.

If Sudan is to chart a path out of this dark and destructive chapter, it must prioritize the rule of law and dismantle the entrenched dynamics fueling conflict. Succumbing to the logic of revenge threatens the nation's fragile social fabric, amplifying discord and division rather than paving the way for reconciliation and unity.

Indeed, these retaliatory crimes do not contribute to ending the war. On the contrary, they exacerbate existing wounds in Sudan's social fabric, creating long-term challenges with potentially devastating consequences. While military advancements are critical, they cannot bring about a conclusive end to the war. A sustainable resolution demands the implementation of a new, inclusive national project—one that addresses the root causes of the conflict, reflects the aspirations of the Sudanese people, and fosters long-term stability.

The RSF militias and their allies, however, are actively working to undermine such efforts. Through threats and determined efforts to fragment the country—such as forming a government in their shrinking territories—they seek to prolong the war and further entrench chaos in Sudan. These attempts are little more than desperate maneuvers to legitimize the RSF's presence on the political stage after its fascist and criminal nature has been exposed to the world. The recent designation by the United States on January 7, 2025, of the RSF's crimes as constituting genocide is a stark confirmation of this reality.

The devastation inflicted by the RSF militia across its controlled territories—ranging from ethnic massacres and genocide in Geneina, to widespread murder, looting, and sexual violence in Khartoum and Al-Jazirah—underscores the calamitous consequences of its authority. RSF atrocities culminate in acts that are inconsistent with peace, civilian protection or stability such as the bombing of civilian infrastructure, exemplified by the attack on the hydroelectric power station at Merowe Dam on January 13, 2025, which crippled 40% of the nation's electricity supply. These actions unveil the nature of the government which RSF and its allies promising the Sudanese with as a regime predicated on violence, crime, and destruction, utterly devoid of legitimacy or humanity.

Only a national project is capable of ending the war in Sudan, and it must be grounded in a comprehensive and coherent vision, one that integrates three essential and interdependent pillars. These elements form the foundation for any genuine political and social transformation aimed at halting the conflict and building a just and stable state.

Pillar One: Reclaiming Normalcy of Life in Sudan
It is impossible to discuss ending the war in Sudan without addressing and resolving the dire reality of internal displacement and external refuge, which has become the grim fate of more than 12 million Sudanese, in addition to the humanitarian crisis that made more than 25 million Sudanese in desperate need of aid. This tragedy is not merely a humanitarian disaster but a direct violation of the fundamental condition of the state's existence in Sudan: the preservation of the stability, safety, and dignity of its citizens. Therefore, restoring human dignity and ensuring stability must be the cornerstones of any viable political project. The reality of the war exposed a structural failure within the political and social systems in Sudan, demanding immediate and comprehensive action to restore the country's stability. Herein lies the need to redefine the very concept of politics in Sudan.

Drawing from Max Weber's definition of the state as the political entity that monopolizes the legitimate use of violence within society, this state monopoly is only legitimate when the state is employed to achieve communal objectives spearheaded by stability, security, and social services. From this perspective, politics in Sudan must be fundamentally reoriented toward serving these public needs. It should evolve into a service-oriented endeavor, placing social services at the heart of political action. This includes ensuring food security, healthcare, education, and other essential needs that enable the restoration of the normalcy of life in Sudan.

Alleviating the suffering of millions and guaranteeing the return of life to its normalcy must not be regarded as a mere humanitarian goal but as the cornerstone of any genuine project aiming to stop the war in Sudan. This endeavor entails reconstruction of the relation between the Sudanese state and its citizens on new foundations that transcend current repulsion. The focus of this process must be on restoring trust in state institutions that have been eroded by political conflicts, civil wars, and systemic corruption. Achieving this is intricately linked to the other pillars of the national project, making it an indispensable prerequisite for any meaningful transformation.

Pillar Two: Uniting Sudanese, Mending the Social Fabric, and Addressing the Damage of Divisive Narratives
The national project to halt the war must address the profound challenges that have torn apart Sudan's social fabric. While these fractures have deep historical roots, the ethnic incitement propagated by the RSF militia has exacerbated and inflamed them in order to use them as a tool for recruitment and ethnic militarization. This narrative was not a mere wartime tactic but a systematic attempt to redefine the national affiliation along narrow ethnic and regional lines, resulting in a deep rupture in the pre-existing uniting factors of the Sudanese people.

The RSF militia, aided by political allies, has sought to grant this war a false legitimacy by embedding it with social dimensions. This primarily advances the ambitions of external interests and regional agendas aimed at fragmenting Sudan into smaller, more controllable entities. The true peril here lies in the instrumentalization of ethnic identity as a means to dismantle the national state. By manipulating primary identities, attention is diverted from the underlying socio-economic challenges. This tactic demonstrates how cultural and ethnic identities could be weaponized as tools of political and social domination, serving to entrench fascist hegemonic power while masking deeper economic and political objectives. Ethnic identity, as Benedict Anderson effectively demonstrated in his seminal work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, becomes a tool for powerful elites who want to maintain or increase their control by posing as the "genuine" representative of a people.

Thus, redefining Sudan's national identity is an urgent necessity within the framework of the national project to end the war. National identity and belonging must stem from the state's guarantee of rights and its provision of services, ensuring that national allegiance is founded on the country's delivery of justice and services to its citizens, rather than on ethnic or regional affiliations. This redefinition of identity restores the concept of "the state as a shared project," where all citizens feel integrally connected to the nation's future.

Grassroots social reconciliation is a fundamental entry point for achieving this goal. Civil society plays a crucial role in building bridges of trust. Grassroots structures, such as Sufi orders with their transcendent influence over ethnic and regional divides, hold significant potential to promote coexistence and tolerance. Elements of local culture can overcome political divisions when used to unify diverse groups under a shared framework of values.

By involving these social structures in national reconciliation processes, comprehensive grassroots reconciliation can be achieved, surpassing the current conflicts. This approach will restore to the Sudanese people a sense of shared belonging, recognizing that the multiplicity of identities within individuals and communities is not a problem. It will also foster more inclusive ties based on shared interests and values rather than the singularity of ethnic divisions, transforming national unity into a tangible and substantive project rather than a mere slogan or banner.

Pillar Three: Reconceptualizing the Transitional Project in Sudan
Achieving political stability in Sudan is an essential qualification for ending the war and it requires a thorough reconstruction of the political transitional framework. The transitional framework should be based on the aspirations of the December 2018 revolution, and it must ensure democratic civilian governance that reflects the will of the people and reinforces their sovereignty over government decisions. However, it does also need to address the question of today, which war has posed with its grim reality.

This transition is not merely a political step; it represents a significant process aimed at detaching from the legacy of three decades of corruption and authoritarianism under the National Congress Party's rule, as well as addressing the long-standing factors of political instability that has hindered the evolution of mature political practices in the country.

Francis Fukuyama elucidates in his book Political Order and Political Decay, that political stability is contingent upon the existence of robust and capable institutions that define the relationship between the state and society, ensuring a balance between authority and accountability. Consequently, Sudan's political transition—or what may aptly be termed its "political maturation"—must commence with gradual institutional reform encompassing both the civil and military sectors of the state. Establishing solid foundations for good governance is imperative for the future of Sudan.

Gradual institutional reform includes enacting and implementing laws that regulate democratic processes in a fair and transparent manner. Questions regarding the criteria for inclusion and participation in the political process must be overcome; as such, inclusive participation should be intrinsic and granted. The appropriate questions should focus on the exceptional grounds for exclusion. Sudanese should acknowledge the general rule and think about its exceptions, rather than the exception being the focus of the political thinking. Standards of law and justice, not ideological judgments, should establish these exceptions. The exclusion of any individual or group from political participation should be exceptional and explicitly linked to crimes and violations in which they have been personally or institutionally implicated rather than ideological score-settling. 

The transitional process should also involve establishing decentralized governance structures that reflect the needs of various regions and adequately represent their populations in the political equation. But at the same time, these decentralized governance systems in Sudan should not be designed to allow the central authority to evade its historical obligations in addressing horizontal structural inequalities. On the contrary, the aim of these structures should be to grant the country's peripheries adequate authority over their resources, alongside preferential development tailored to regions that have experienced inequity.

Moreover, one of the most critical aspects of this transition is the drafting of a permanent constitution for Sudan—an "absent obligation" in the Sudan's political history. Constitutions are not mere legal documents; they are social and political instruments that guarantee freedoms and promote justice, as Amartya Sen highlights. Reaching a consensus on what makes Sudan, a state and homeland for its people is the foundation of the permanent constitution which is, therefore, essential for achieving national unity and entrenching the foundations of democracy. This process, as essential as it is, should prioritize simplicity and straightforwardness. It should not focus on drowning in structural details and dialectical rhetoric and avoid the attempts to throw in ideological bidding and texts to guarantee the political domination of certain groups, which are all issues that hindered the making of a permanent constitution in Sudan in the past. Rather, these must be avoided in favor of focusing on reaching consensus on the fundamentals that concern citizens.

Additionally, reforming the civil service and the security and military apparatus is an integral part of this project. These institutions require comprehensive reform and modernization to ensure their neutrality and efficiency, eradicating politicization and transforming them into tools for serving the citizenry rather than instruments of control. A stable state is one that possesses institutions dedicated to serving society rather than exploiting it. Thus, rebuilding the security and military apparatus (which are the direct tools of control) based on professionalism and accountability is a fundamental condition for stability.

The transition toward civilian democratic governance in Sudan is not merely a structural change in the apparatus of power; it represents a radical shift in the relationship between the state and society. This process requires strong political will, the inclusion of all societal groups, and careful consideration of the accumulated challenges to ensure the achievement of peace, stability, and justice, which the Sudanese people aspire to realize.

These factors and the accompanying process, while some may argue they are overly complex, protracted, or secondary to other pressing priorities, must be addressed with urgency and determination. They represent the only viable pathway to manufacturing genuine and lasting stability in Sudan. Neglecting these imperatives, whether through apathy, procrastination, or deliberate obstruction, risks not only perpetuating the ongoing war and compounding its devastating human toll but also undermining the very foundation of Sudan's existence as a cohesive state and nation. Failure to confront these challenges threatens to unravel the social, political, and institutional structures essential to preserving Sudan's sovereignty and unity. The stakes are immense, and the cost of inaction could be irreversible.

Although it is impractical to anticipate the swift completion of this process or the broader dimensions of the national project, achieving consensus on its objectives and foundational steps is indispensable. This initial agreement serves as a pivotal step toward ending the war and establishing the groundwork for a stable, secure, and prosperous Sudan in the future.
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Amgad Fareid El-Tayeb

Executive Director of Fikra for Studies and Development

Previously served as the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Sudan; Dr. Abdalla Hamdok during the transitional period following the toppling of the Islamic dictatorship in Sudan.  He has also served as a political advisor to the United Nations Special Political Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He made a prominent political and social contribution to the liberation movement to overthrow Bashir's Islamic regime before and during the December 2018 revolution. He served as the head of the foreign relations committee of the Sudanese Professional Association and Spokesperson of it during the revolution. Founder of the Nafeer Initiative in 2013 and contributed significantly to the establishment of the Girifna and Sudan Change Now movements. He has also written extensively on cases of violations of migrants' rights, democratization, and issues of military and civil institutional reforms in Sudan. He can be contacted by email at: amjedfarid@gmail.com , Amgad@fikrasd.com
Twitter: @amjedfarid

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